How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? the effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm. by Anbarci,  N. & Feltovich,  N.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
30 August 2018
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Anbarci, N. and Feltovich, N. (2018) 'How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? the eﬀects of
bargaining institution and the 5050 norm.', Journal of economic behavior organization., 145 . pp. 320-334.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2018 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
How fully do people exploit their bargaining position?
The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm
Nejat Anbarci
Deakin Business School
Department of Economics
Burwood VIC 3125, Australia
nejat.anbarci@deakin.edu.au
Nick Feltovich∗
Department of Economics, Monash Business School
Monash University
Clayton VIC 3800, Australia
nicholas.feltovich@monash.edu
October 11, 2017
Abstract
A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under–exploit their bargaining po-
sition, compared to theoretical predictions. We conduct an experiment using two institutions: Nash
demand game (NDG) and unstructured bargaining game (UBG). Unlike most previous experiments, dis-
agreement payoffs are earned rather than assigned, and about one–fourth of the time, one bargainer’s
disagreement payoff is more than half the cake size (“dominant bargaining power”), so that equal splits
are not individually rational.
Subjects under–respond to their bargaining position most severely in the NDG without dominant
bargaining power. Responsiveness increases in the UBG, but is still lower than predicted; the same is
true for the NDG with dominant bargaining power. Only in the UBG with dominant bargaining power –
the combination of a bargaining institution with low strategic uncertainty and elimination of the 50–50
“security blanket” – do subjects approximately fully exploit their bargaining position.
Journal of Economic Literature classifications: C78, C72, D81, C90.
Keywords: Nash demand game; unstructured bargaining; real effort; dominant bargaining power; ex-
periment.
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1 Background
Bargaining is pervasive. Its role in determining prices is well known: even in Western societies, where hag-
gling over small purchases has been de–emphasised, large goods (e.g., new and used cars, houses) are often
sold by bargaining. Bargaining is frequently used to set employees’ compensation packages and other work-
ing conditions, at either the group level (for unionised jobs) or the individual level (in many professional
labour markets).1 Collective decision making in politics is often modelled using a bargaining framework
(e.g., Baron and Ferejohn (1989) use a multi–player version of the Nash demand game to investigate the
behaviour of legislatures). Bargaining settings are also used to understand pre–trial behaviour in legal dis-
putes (Daughety, 2000; Spier, 2007) and international treaty negotiations (see, e.g., Fisher and Ury’s (1981)
discussion of the role of bargaining during the 1973–1982 Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea). Thomas Schelling was not exaggerating when he famously noted that “[t]o study the strategy
of conflict is to take the view that most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations” (Schelling,
1960, p. 5).
A fundamental principle of bargaining is that outcomes depend on bargaining power. Even before bar-
gaining settings were thought of as leading to precise predictions, it was generally understood that the
division of surplus would depend on the two parties’ relative bargaining positions (Edgeworth, 1881). Later
axiomatic bargaining solution concepts (e.g., Nash, 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) formalised this
dependence and quantified it by specifying a precise outcome – the bargaining solution – based on the most
important features of the environment. Even non–cooperative game–theoretic approaches, which may yield
a multiplicity of theoretical predictions, can narrow these down to a unique prediction with minor additional
assumptions. With a unique prediction comes a well–defined comparative–static relationship between spe-
cific features of the environment – in particular, the bargaining position of one player relative to the other –
and that prediction.
Whether these theoretical implications are seen in real bargaining is an empirical question. Previous
research (see Section 3) suggests that bargainers are actually less responsive to changes in bargaining po-
sition than predicted, and in particular, the social norm of 50–50 splits of the “cake” (the amount being
bargained over) seems to exert a powerful pull on outcomes.2 While the extent of this under–responsiveness
varies widely across studies, there has been surprisingly little systematic examination of the factors associ-
ated with it: in what settings do people tend to exploit their bargaining power to a greater or lesser degree,
how much impact do individual aspects of the bargaining setting have, and are there any settings where
1Indeed, many researchers have suggested that male–female wage gaps are at least partly due to sex differences in willingness
or ability to bargain; see, e.g., Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999), Small et al. (2007) and Fortin (2008).
2In this paper, we are agnostic about the reasons behind deviations from the standard theoretical predictions. Two plausible, not
mutually–exclusive, reasons are focal points and fairness preferences. Both have long been proposed as explanations for bargaining
results, with the importance of focal points noted by Schelling (1960), and fairness explanations dating back at least to Hoffman
and Spitzer (1982). Our own previous work has examined the ability of both of these to explain specifically under–responsiveness
to changes in bargaining position (see Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013 and 2016 for fairness and focal points respectively).
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theoretically predicted levels of exploitation should be expected?
The goal of the current paper is to improve understanding of how bargaining outcomes are shaped by
players’ bargaining positions. We use a laboratory experiment, allowing us to maintain, in two important
ways, a high degree of control over the environment relative to observational studies from the field. First,
we are able to standardise the rules under which bargaining takes place, in contrast to field studies that must
aggregate bargaining outcomes from heterogeneous and perhaps imperfectly understood bargaining institu-
tions. Second, we give the subjects complete information about the cake size and disagreement payoffs (the
amounts they get if bargaining is unsuccessful), so that we know, and the subjects had enough information
to compute, the theoretical prediction for any particular bargaining pair.
We implement differences in bargaining positionvia the disagreement outcome, so that it can vary nearly
continuously over a wide range of possible levels, in contrast to many earlier studies that varied bargaining
power in lumpier ways (e.g., first– versus second–mover, number of bargaining stages, endogenous versus
random breakdown). Bargaining theory displays remarkable consensus regarding the predicted effect of the
disagreement outcome. All of the most common axiomatic bargaining solutions – as well as those non–
cooperative techniques that yield unique solutions – have exactly the same implication for this setting: a
unit increase in one’s own disagreement payoff implies a one–half unit increase in one’s own payoff as a
result of bargaining, while a unit increase in one’s opponent’s disagreement payoff implies a corresponding
one–half unit decrease. We call these the own–disagreement–payoff effect and opponent–disagreement–
payoff effect, and their sum – a measure of overall responsiveness to bargaining position – the combined
[disagreement–payoff] effect.
Subjects in our experiment bargain under one of two bargaining institutions, both widespread in bargain-
ing experiments and in theoretical modelling of the bargaining process. In the Nash demand game (NDG),
bargaining consists of a single pair of simultaneous demands. If these total the cake size or less, then each
bargainer receives the amount demanded; otherwise they receive their disagreement payoffs. In the unstruc-
tured bargaining game (UBG), bargainers are given a known time interval, during which either one can
make proposals for splitting the cake. If no proposal is accepted before the time runs out, the bargainers
receive their disagreement payoffs.
Although the distribution of bargaining power in our experiment is typically asymmetric due to the
bargainers having different disagreement payoffs, the two institutions themselves are symmetric in the sense
that neither bargainer is given a structural advantage (in contrast, for example, to the ultimatum game or
Rubinstein (1982) bargaining, both of which favour the first mover). However, the two institutions have
markedly different levels of strategic uncertainty, resulting in a much more severe coordination problem in
the NDG than the UBG; previous research (Feltovich and Swierzbinski, 2011) has found this not only leads
to fewer agreements in the NDG, but for agreements to gravitate toward 50–50 splits of the cake. Because of
this, we hypothesise that subjects will be less responsive to changes in their bargaining power in that game
than in the UBG. That is, disagreement–payoff effects should be higher in the UBG than in the NDG.
Our variation of the disagreement outcome gives rise to another set of hypotheses involving the 50–
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50 split. About one–fourth of the time, one of the bargainers has a disagreement payoff more than half
of the cake size; we call this dominant bargaining power. When an individual has dominant bargaining
power, agreeing to a 50–50 split involves an actual monetary sacrifice, making it substantially less attractive
compared to situations where neither bargainer has dominant bargaining power (in which case a 50–50 split
may mean accepting a smaller gain relative to the disagreement payoff than one’s co–bargainer, but not
an outright money loss). With the focal power of the 50–50 split gone, subjects should be drawn toward
alternative focal points like equal sharing of the surplus (the remainder of the cake after both disagreement
payoffs are subtracted) that entail disagreement–payoff responsiveness equal to the theoretically predicted
level. That is, disagreement–payoff effects are expected to be higher with dominant bargaining power than
without it.
A notable feature of our experimental procedures is the use of earned bargaining power. Specifically,
subjects’ disagreement payoffs, rather than being exogenously selected and assigned by the experimenter,
are based on performance on a simple but repetitive “real effort” task. Besides arguably being more realistic
(a disagreement payoff in real bargaining – being the value of the best alternative to agreement – is often the
result of past decisions, effort, and intrinsic abilities), making subjects earn their bargaining power ought to
nudge them toward more fully exploiting it, whether this is due to taking their decisions more seriously in
some general sense, or to the effort expended in the task changing perceptions of the bargainers’ property
rights over the cake. In either case, earned bargaining power should reduce the attraction of the 50–50 split
and increase responsiveness to disagreement payoffs. Our experiment is novel, as there have been very few
bargaining studies that vary bargaining power nearly continuously through a large range of levels, few in
which bargaining power depends on skill and effort, extremely few that vary whether individually rational
50–50 splits can be ruled out, and to our knowledge, none with all of these features.
Our experimental results broadly confirm our conjectures regarding (1) the bargaining institution and
(2) dominant bargaining power. When subjects bargain in the NDG and neither of them has dominant bar-
gaining power, we observe severe under–responsiveness. In the UBG with no dominant bargaining power,
subjects are substantially more responsive than in the NDG, but still less so than theory predicts. When
one bargainer does have dominant bargaining power, by contrast, own– and opponent–disagreement–payoff
effects are significantly larger. In the NDG, this increase still leaves responsiveness well below the theoret-
ically predicted level. In the UBG, however, the increase leads to a level of responsiveness in line with the
theory. Thus it takes the combination of a bargaining institution with low levels of strategic uncertainty and
elimination of the 50–50 “security blanket” for bargaining behaviour to yield outcomes like those predicted
by the theory.
2 The bargaining environment
There is a fixed sum of money (a cake) available to the players, which we normalise to one. Negative pay-
ments are not possible, so a feasible agreement is a non–negative pair totalling one or less. If bargaining is
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unsuccessful, the players receive disagreement payoffs; the favoured player receives df and the unfavoured
player receives du, with df ≥ du ≥ 0 and df + du < 1 (see Figure 1). The values of df and du (and the
cake size of one) are assumed to be common knowledge.
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Figure 1: The bargaining environment
2.1 Nash demand game (NDG)
In the Nash (1953) demand game, bargaining consists of a single pair of simultaneously made demands xf
and xu by the favoured and unfavoured players respectively. If the demands are compatible (xf + xu ≤ 1),
then each player receives the amount demanded (with any remainder left “on the table”). If the demands are
incompatible (xf + xu > 1), then they receive their disagreement payoffs.
The NDG is simple enough to be analysed by standard non–cooperative techniques, but the result is not
a unique prediction. If Nash equilibrium is the solution concept used, there are many solutions, including
(a) efficient pure–strategy equilibria in which xf ≥ df , xu ≥ du and xf + xu = 1, leading to payoffs
(xf , xu); (b) inefficient pure–strategy equilibria in which xf > 1 − du and xu > 1 − df , with resulting
payoffs (df , du); and (c) inefficient mixed–strategy equilibria with expected payoffs totalling less than 1 but
more than df + du.
Equilibrium selection criteria such as payoff dominance or efficiency can reduce the set of equilibria,
eliminating the inefficient equilibria mentioned above. Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) criterion of risk dom-
inance goes even further, making the unique prediction that players split the surplus (the remainder after
disagreement payoffs are subtracted from the cake) evenly: xf =
1
2
(1+df −du) and xu =
1
2
(1−df +du).
The same prediction is entailed by Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) general solution concept, or by combining
payoff dominance (or efficiency) with a notion of symmetry defined relative to the individually rational set
(rather than the entire bargaining set).
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2.2 Unstructured bargaining game (UBG)
In the unstructured bargaining game, players have a fixed, known amount of time available to negotiate a
mutually agreeable division of the cake. Either player can propose any feasible payoff pair. There is no
constraint (other than the time available) on the number, ordering and timing of proposals that can be made,
and the cake size remains the same until the time runs out. Either player can accept any opponent proposal;
the first accepted proposal is implemented. (In case both players accept proposals at the same instant, each is
implemented with probability one–half.) If no proposal is accepted before the time limit, the disagreement
outcome is imposed.
The UBG is too complex to be analysed by standard non–cooperative game–theoretic methods without
making additional assumptions (see, e.g., Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989; Perry and Reny, 1993, 1994; and
de Groot Ruiz et al., 2016). Instead, we make use of techniques from cooperative game theory, which
says little about the precise strategies used by the two players, but has implications about the bargaining
outcome itself. The core predicts that the division of the cake corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium
outcome (xf ≥ df , xu ≥ du and xf + xu = 1), but makes no sharper prediction. Axiomatic bargaining
solution concepts can refine this multiplicity of predicted outcomes to a unique one. If the bargainers are
risk–neutral, then the outcome of every well–known axiomatic bargaining solution (including the Nash and
Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions) coincides, with xf =
1
2
(1 + df − du) and xu =
1
2
(1− df + du).
2.3 Disagreement–payoff effects
So, the prediction of Nash equilibrium (with the additional assumptions of either risk dominance or effi-
ciency and symmetry) for the NDG, and the predictions of the well–known axiomatic bargaining solutions
for both the NDG and the UBG, all imply the same outcome:
xf =
1
2
(1 + df − du) and xu =
1
2
(1− df + du), (1)
as noted in the last two sections.3 This solution implies
xf − xu = df − du (2)
(the difference in the bargainers’ payoffs from bargaining is equal to the difference between their disagree-
ment payoffs), or equivalently, xf − df = xu − du (bargainers gain equal amounts over their disagreement
3Risk dominance applied to the NDG, and Nash’s (1950) axiomatic bargaining solution applied to the UBG, yield identical
predictions for general bargaining sets, as long as both settings use the same feasible set and disagreement outcome. This fact,
pointed out by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), follows immediately from both concepts’ maximisation of the same expression (the
“Nash product”). Other ways of relating axiomatic bargaining solutions (often, but not always, Nash’s solution) of unstructured
bargaining settings to equilibrium play in a suitable structured bargaining setting involve uncertainty about whether incompatible
demands could nonetheless be satisfied, or incomplete information about payoffs (e.g., Nash, 1953; Crawford, 1977, 1979; Moulin,
1984; Binmore, 1987; Carlsson, 1991; Carlsson and van Damme, 1993).
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payoffs). Also, it implies a sharp theoretical prediction concerning the relationship between the individual
disagreement payoffs and the bargaining outcome:
∂xf
∂df
=
∂xu
∂du
=
1
2
(3)
∂xf
∂du
=
∂xu
∂df
= −
1
2
. (4)
That is, both the “own–disagreement–payoff effect” and the “opponent–disagreement–payoff effect” have
magnitudes of 0.5.
An obvious corollary is that the sum of these magnitudes (the “combined effect”) is unity:
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂xf
∂df
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
+
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂xf
∂du
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂xu
∂df
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
+
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂xu
∂du
∣
∣
∣
∣
= 1. (5)
Indeed, even some bargaining solutions that do not imply own– and opponent–disagreement–payoff effects
of one–half still imply that their combined effect is exactly one (e.g., the generalised Nash solution that
maximises the expression [xf − df ]
θ[xu − du]
1−θ for given θ ∈ [0, 1]). Also, Anbarci and Feltovich
(2013) show that when bargainers are risk averse with (possibly different) constant absolute risk aversion
preferences, both risk dominance and the Nash bargaining solution imply a combined effect of exactly one,
and if either has constant relative risk aversion preferences instead, the combined effect is at least one.
3 Related literature
We will not go into detail regarding the huge literature on bargaining experiments in general (for surveys,
see Roth, 1995 and Camerer, 2003, pp. 151–198). Despite this expansive literature, there has been very
little research into the effects of disagreement outcomes in particular. What previous work there has been
has usually varied disagreement outcomes as a “side–treatment”, in conjunction with some other manipula-
tion intended to address the primary research question. Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) examined unstructured
bargaining games with (in essence) a fixed, known cake size and one of two randomly chosen disagreement
outcomes. Disagreement outcomes were very asymmetric: approximately (0.79, 0) and (0, 0.83) in their
“Decision 1” and (0.81, 0.08) and (0, 0.85) in their “Decision 2”. Hoffman and Spitzer found a substantial
frequency of equal splits of the cake, even though such splits require some bargainers to agree to payments
well below their disagreement payoffs. Their results taken at face value would suggest that dominant bar-
gaining power has little influence on bargaining outcomes; however, this may carry little implication for our
experiment, due to the lack of anonymity in their procedures (not only did their experiment use face–to–face
bargaining, but subjects reaching agreement were required to jointly sign a record sheet).
With equal splits frequently occurring even in settings like Hoffman and Spitzer’s, it is perhaps not
surprising that a strand of the literature has been devoted specifically to the focal nature of equal splits in
bargaining. Besides the well–known phenomena of 50–50 splits in ultimatum and dictator games (Roth,
1995, pp. 254–292; Camerer, 2003, pp. 48–59) and in symmetric bargaining (see footnote 6), there have
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been several experiments showing large differences in behaviour according to whether 50–50 splits are
available. Gu¨th et al. (2001) considered binary ultimatum games where proposers have only two pure
strategies: a demand of 85% of the cake and, depending on the treatment, 45%, 50% or 55%. They found
that demands of 85% were substantially less frequent when the alternative was 50% (a proposal of an equal
split) than when the alternative was either of the other two demands. Falk et al. (2003), also looking at
binary ultimatum games, found that responders reject demands of 80% of the cake much more often when
the proposer’s alternative was a 50% demand than when the alternative was a 100% demand, a 20% demand
or a duplicate 80% demand. Levati et al. (2014) elicit preference orderings over outcomes for second movers
in a trust game, and dictators in a dictator game, and find that when 50–50 splits are an available option, these
subjects are much more likely to submit preferences that are non–single–peaked (and thus inconsistent with
own–monetary–payoff maximisation as well as nearly all standard models of other–regarding preferences).
Janssen (2006) discusses 50–50 splits as a focal point in both the ultimatum game and the Nash demand
game, while Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) present examples of the 50–50 norm in the field and report
experimental results suggesting that subjects conform to this norm more closely when deviations can be
attributed to themselves (rather than luck).
The first experiment with earned bargaining power was from Hoffman and Spitzer (1985). In some of
their cells, favourable bargaining position was assigned randomly, while in others, it was assigned based on
performance in a game of skill. Perhaps surprisingly, the way favoured status was assigned had only a minor
effect; rather, their data indicate that in order for subjects to exploit their bargaining position, it must be that
both (1) bargaining power is perceived by subjects to be earned (their “game trigger” treatment), and (2)
instructions make clear that exploiting bargaining power is acceptable behaviour (their “moral authority”
treatment), with the latter more important than the former. However, even with both a game trigger and
moral authority, the favoured player’s average payoff from bargaining was still less than her disagreement
payoff, though as in their 1982 study, this may be due to a lack of subject anonymity.
Several more recent papers have used effort and/or skill to allocate bargaining roles, typically for ulti-
matum or dictator games (Hoffman et al., 1994; Schurter and Wilson, 2007; Bolton and Karago¨zog˘lu, 2016;
Rodriguez-Lara, 2016). In these settings, under–responsiveness to changes in bargaining position arises
naturally from theoretical predictions being on opposite endpoints of the outcome space, but even so, the
evidence is fairly mixed about the impact of earned bargaining power. For example, Schurter and Wilson
(2007) found dictator–game offers were lower when the dictator position is assigned via a quiz than via a
die roll, but they were lower still when it was assigned on the basis of seniority (number of credit hours
completed or attempted). Other experiments have used effort and/or skill for reasons other than allocating
bargaining power: e.g., to determine the cake size (Ruffle, 1998; Konow, 2000; Cherry et al., 2002; Parrett,
2006; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Karago¨zog˘lu and Riedl, 2015; Birkeland, 2011; Corgnet et al., 2011)
or to give one bargainer “moral authority” to receive a larger share of the cake (Ga¨chter and Riedl, 2005;
Rode and Le Menestrel, 2011; Karago¨zog˘lu and Riedl, 2015; Bolton and Karago¨zog˘lu, 2016). Most of
these studies did not explicitly test tasks versus luck (as we also do not). Rather, at this point the consensus
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seems fairly well established that subjects take their decisions more seriously when some aspect of the set-
ting has been “earned”, and real–effort tasks (and related devices like quizzes) have now become part of the
experimental economist’s tool–box, without the need to re–evaluate them in every new setting.
The first study to vary predicted bargaining outcomes over multiple values covering a large range was
Kahn and Murnighan’s (1993) alternating–offer bargaining experiment. They varied five treatment variables
– discount factor, breakdown probability, second mover’s outside option, availability of a unilateral opt–out,
and who was the first mover – through two values each in a factorial design, with the resulting 32 cells
yielding 16 distinct equilibrium predictions. Depending on which outcome measure was used (first mover’s
payoff, second mover’s payoff, first mover’s initial demand, second mover’s initial demand), actual respon-
siveness to changes in bargaining power varied from 48 percent to 88 percent of predicted responsiveness.
The studies most closely related to ours have induced variation in bargaining position via a single vari-
able – disagreement payoffs – varied systematically throughmultiple values. Fischer et al. (2007) examine a
variant of the NDG, where players simultaneously submit an ambitious demand xi and a fallback demand gi.
They receive their ambitious demands if they are compatible; if not, they each get their fallback demand if
these are compatible, or disagreement payoffs di if not. Their main research question was whether behaviour
differed between this game and an ultimatum game, but they used eleven disagreement outcomes with
perfect negative correlation between own and opponent disagreement payoffs, allowing computation of a
combined disagreement–payoff effect. (The perfect correlation prevents separate measurement of own– and
opponent–disagreement–payoff effects.) On average, their results imply that |∂xi/∂di|+|∂xi/∂d−i| ≈ 0.71
and |∂gi/∂di|+|∂gi/∂d−i| ≈ 0.78: that is, observed responsiveness to disagreement outcomes was roughly
three–fourths of the theoretical prediction.4
Finally, Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) had subjects bargaining in either the NDG or the UBG, with
disagreement payoffs varying from 5% to 45% of the cake, and drawn randomly in each round. They
found that in the NDG, the own–disagreement–payoff effect |∂xi/∂di| was about 0.2 and the opponent–
disagreement–payoff effect |∂xi/∂d−i| was slightly lower, yielding a combined effect roughly 40% of the
predicted level. In the UBG, both effects were about 0.3 – significantly more than in the NDG, but still only
about 60% of the predicted level.
Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, our use of earned – rather than assigned
– bargaining position allows us a test of the robustness of previous under–responsiveness results. One
might expect that subjects dismiss advantaged status that they consider to have been allocated arbitrarily or
unfairly; such a view would push bargaining outcomes toward 50–50 splits, decreasing responsiveness to
variation in bargaining position.5 If so, we would expect to find higher disagreement–payoff responsiveness
4Their results for the ultimatum game were similar, with proposers’ demands responding 76 percent as much to changes in the
disagreement outcome as theoretically predicted. A more recent ultimatum game experiment by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2013)
found lower responsiveness: 45 percent for proposers’ offers and 55 percent for responders’ minimum acceptable offers.
5Ball and Eckel (1998) find some evidence that subjects in an ultimatum–game experiment behave more in line with theoretical
predictions when the proposer (who is structurally favoured in that game) had been given a symbol of status based on a high quiz
score, and the (unfavoured) responder had not been given the status symbol. See also Ball et al. (2001) for a similar result in a
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than previous studies did.
Second, the particulars of our design makes it likely that in a significant fraction of bargaining pairs,
one of the bargainers will have a disagreement payoff more than 50% of the cake (“dominant bargaining
power”). In such cases, equal splits are not individually rational, and hence not consistent with equilibrium;
by contrast, when neither player has dominant bargaining power, equal splits are always consistent with
equilibrium. If under–responsiveness to bargaining position is the result of equal splits providing a powerful
focal point in bargaining, then removing this focal point ought to lead to higher responsiveness. Previous
experiments that varied bargaining position either did not present situations with such “dominant bargaining
power” (e.g., Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013), had them in too few cases to allow rigorous comparisons to
situations without dominant bargaining power (e.g., Fischer et al., 2007), or had few or no cases without
dominant bargaining power (e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982), again preventing comparisons.
4 The experiment
The real–effort task used to determine bargaining position was adapted from the one used by Erkal et al.
(2011). A sample screen–shot is shown in the supplementary materials. The basic unit of the task was the
encoding of a sequence of 2–9 letters (a “word”) into numerals, based on a key displayed on the computer
screen for the entirety of the task. Below each letter was a blank space; to encode the word, the subject
needed to type the numeral corresponding to each letter in the space below it, then click a button once the
word was finished. If the word was encoded correctly, it was accepted and the word was replaced by a new
word. If the word was encoded incorrectly, an error message stated the incorrectly–encoded letter (or the
first, if there were multiple errors), and the subject could go back and make changes as desired.
At the beginning of a round, a sequence of 400 letters was randomly drawn (with replacement); each
letter had an equal chance of being chosen for any given place in the sequence. At the same time, the key
– a permutation of (1, 2, ..., 26) – was randomly chosen from the set of all such permutations. Thus, both
the key and the sequence of letters changed from round to round, though both were common to all subjects
within a round of a session. Our use of a random sequence of letters means that the vast majority of our
“words” were not actual words (in contrast with Erkal et al.’s task, which used a deterministic list of English
words); this was done in order that subjects would not be privileged based on their ability to read English.
Drawing a new key and sequence of letters in each round of each session was done in order to minimise
differences across rounds due to memorisation.
Variation in task difficulty was accomplished by varying the lengths of the words. Each subject in each
round was given words of changing lengths, drawn i.i.d. from a distribution that was fixed for that subject
and round. At the beginning of a session, each subject was assigned a type (advantaged or disadvantaged)
that remained fixed throughout the session. Both types of subject faced an easy and a hard version of the
task; the four distributions are shown in Table 1. Note that for each type, the hard version of the task
double–auction market.
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Table 1: Real–effort task – distributions of word lengths
Type Task Probability of word length Expected
version 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 word length
Advantaged Easy 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 3.5
Hard 0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 4.5
Disadvantaged Easy 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0 6.5
Hard 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 7.5
contained longer words, in the sense of first–order stochastic dominance, than the easier version. However,
the advantaged player was always advantaged; even the disadvantaged/easy distribution contained longer
words than the advantaged/hard distribution.
Assigning an easier version of the task to one subject in a pair than the other serves two important
functions in the experiment. First, it decreases the likelihood that the subjects will have equal or nearly equal
disagreement payoffs. This matters because many previous experiments have shown symmetric bargaining
games to have an extremely strong tendency toward 50–50 splits of the cake, and even with some asymmetry,
the 50–50 norm provides a powerful focal point that can affect what outcome the pair does reach.6 Second,
it allows the difficulty of the task to be set so that one member of a bargaining pair has a reasonable chance
of earning dominant bargaining power without a corresponding risk that both bargainers will do so. When
exactly one bargainer has dominant bargaining power, 50–50 splits are ruled out as an equilibrium outcome,
but other agreements are still possible; if both bargainers had dominant bargaining power, there would be
no gains to agreement, making the bargaining problem trivial.
Except for a one–minute practice round, subjects were allotted five minutes in each round for the task.
At the beginning of this time, a word length k1i was drawn randomly from the relevant distribution for subject
i. That subject’s first word would be made up of letters 1 through k1i of the sequence that had been drawn
for that round. When that word was correctly encoded, a new word length k2i was drawn, independently of
the previous word length, and the subject’s second word would comprise letters k1i + 1 through k
1
i + k
2
i of
the sequence. In a similar way, the subject’s j–th word was made up of the first kji letters that had not been
used yet. Thus, all subjects in a session faced the same sequence of letters; it was only the way the sequence
was broken up into words that varied across subjects.
We would like to remark that implementing disagreement outcomes via real–effort tasks rather than
exogenously – while possibly having the advantage that subjects internalise them to a greater extent – is not
costless. One obvious cost of having disagreement payoffs depend on performance in the task is that the
experimenter loses a modicum of control over these disagreement payoffs. Fischer, Gu¨th and Pull (2007)
6 See Nydegger and Owen (1975) and Roth and Malouf (1979) for experimental comparisons of symmetric and asymmetric
bargaining.
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and Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) were able to specify the exact disagreement outcomes subjects faced (in
the former paper) or the exact distribution from which these outcomes were drawn (in the latter). In the
current paper, we are unable to do so, since the outcomes depend on subjects’ behaviour. Indeed, even with
the substantial difference in difficulty between the advantaged player’s and disadvantaged player’s tasks,
we cannot guarantee that within a bargaining pair, the advantaged player will have the favoured bargaining
position.
A second disadvantage concerns the time subjects spend on the real–effort task, which is time they are
not spending on the bargaining game. The five minutes in each round allocated to the task itself, along with
another half–minute for related aspects such as feedback, carry an opportunity cost of two to three rounds
of bargaining in the UBG, or four to five rounds in the NDG. This has two negative implications: fewer
data points of bargaining for a given length of session (and thus, roughly speaking, for a given budget for
subject payments), and less opportunity for subjects to acquire experience in the bargaining task, leading to
a higher variance in the data and more outliers (though on the plus side, the smaller number of rounds in
our experiment implies higher stakes per bargaining round, so that subjects might be expected to take their
decisions more seriously). Both of these implications complicate comparisons to previous studies that used
endowed bargaining power.
Finally, there is no guarantee that our use of a real–effort task will succeed in getting subjects to view
their bargaining power as earned. As we will discuss in the next section, we made the differences in task
difficulty (within and between subjects) as opaque as possible, in an attempt to get subjects to view their
bargaining power as arising from skill and effort rather than luck. However, it is possible that especially
clever subjects could infer the role that luck played in determining their disagreement payoffs. It is also
possible that some subjects may have considered the task itself to be sufficiently contrived that bargaining
power based on performance on it would never be viewed as being earned. However, since we do not vary
whether disagreement payoffs are earned, neither of these potential issues would result in a loss of control.
At worst, our experiment would reduce to a test of bargaining institution and dominant bargaining power
with endowed rather than earned bargaining power. In that case, if earned bargaining power leads to higher
responsiveness than endowed bargaining power, then our results would under–state responsiveness under
truly earned bargaining power.
4.1 Experimental design and procedures
Sessions consisted of ten rounds, plus an initial practice round with no bargaining and no effect on subjects’
payments. Rounds 1–10 were split into five two–round blocks; within each block, one round comprised
task followed by bargaining, while the other consisted of the task only. In half of the sessions, bargaining
took place in the even–numbered rounds, and in the other half of sessions, bargaining took place in the odd–
numbered rounds (see Table 2).7 The cake size was always £10, and a subject’s disagreement payoff in all
7Within a block, the rounds were identical except for whether bargaining took place. In an earlier working paper (Anbarci
and Feltovich, 2016), we compare task performance with and without a subsequent bargaining round. Since the bargaining round
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bargaining rounds was £0.15 for each word correctly encoded in that round. (In rounds with no bargaining,
this amount was the subject’s payoff for the round.)
Table 2: Experimental design and session information
Cell Bargaining Rounds in which Matching–group Subjects
game bargaining took place sizes
NDG–odd NDG 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 6, 6, 6, 6, 8, 8 40
NDG–even 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 6, 6, 6, 8, 10, 12 48
UBG–odd UBG 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 6, 6, 8, 8, 8, 10 46
UBG–even 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 6, 6, 6, 8, 8, 8 42
Each session comprised one or more matching groups that were closed with respect to interaction (ad-
vantaged subjects in a particular group interacted only with disadvantaged subjects in the same group), so
that data from different matching groups can be considered statistically independent of each other. Subjects
were not given any information about the partitioning into matching groups; combined with the small num-
ber of bargaining rounds (5 per session), this makes repeated–game effects unlikely. Random assignment
to roles (advantaged/disadvantaged) and matching groups took place before the practice round; these were
fixed for the entire session.
Sessions took place at University of Aberdeen; subjects were primarily undergraduate and masters–level
students, and were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a database of people expressing interest in
participating in economics experiments. No one took part more than once. The experiment was run on
networked personal computers, and was programmed using z–Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were
asked not to communicate with other subjects except via the computer program.
At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated in a single room and given written instructions,which
were also read aloud in an attempt to make the rules common knowledge. Once the instructions were read
and questions answered, subjects were given a few demographic questions to answer.8 After all subjects had
submitted their answers, the practice round began.
Subjects were randomly paired in each bargaining round, with each opposite–type subject in the same
matching group equally likely (a two–population protocol). No identifying information was given about
opponents, in an attempt to minimise incentives for reputation building and other supergame effects. Also,
reduces by half the marginal return to completing a unit of the task – and this is reduced still further by under–responsiveness to the
disagreement payoff – one might expect lower task performance in bargaining rounds. We found evidence of such an effect, but it
was weak. See Appendix A of that earlier working paper, or contact the corresponding author, for details.
8Sample instructions and screen–shots are shown in the supplementary materials. The remaining sets of instructions, as well as
the raw data from the experiment, are available from the corresponding author upon request. The demographic questions asked for
subjects’ age, sex, number of economics units completed at university (with “4 or more” as the top category), and number of years
resident in the United Kingdom (with categories 0–1, 1–2, 2–5, 5–10, and 10 or more).
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to reduce demand effects, rather than using terms like “opponent” or “partner” for the other player, we used
neutral terms like “player matched to you”.
Each round began with a screen displaying instructions for the real–effort task, which were also shown
during the task itself. After a few seconds, the task would begin. The task difficulties in each round are
shown in Table 3. Notably, while we used no deception in the experiment, we did not provide specific
Table 3: Real–effort task difficulty by round
Round(s) Task difficulty Time allotted
Advantaged player Disadvantaged player (seconds)
0 (practice) Hard Hard 60
1–2 Hard Hard 300
3–4 Hard Easy 300
5–6 Easy Easy 300
7–8 Easy Hard 300
9–10 Hard Easy 300
information to subjects about how task difficulty varied within– or between–subjects. The only information
they received was the sequence of words they faced in each round, and in bargaining rounds, the opponent’s
number of words encoded (from which clever subjects might have been able to infer some information about
others’ task difficulty).
Rounds without bargaining ended after the time allotted for the task had run out. In rounds with bar-
gaining, after the task finished, subjects were informed of the number of words they and their opponent
had encoded, and the corresponding disagreement payoffs; they were also reminded of the £10 cake size.
After viewing their disagreement outcome, subjects in the NDG treatment were prompted to choose their
demands. Demands could be any whole–number multiple of £0.01 between zero and the cake size inclu-
sive. End–of–round feedback comprised own and opponent words encoded and disagreement payoffs, own
and opponent demands, whether agreement was reached, and own and opponent payoffs. After all subjects
clicked a button on the screen to continue, the session proceeded to the next round.
In the UBG cells, subjects were given a 120–second “negotiation stage” (130 seconds in the first bar-
gaining round) to reach agreement on a division of the cake.9 A proposal consisted of a nonnegativemultiple
9Two minutes for bargaining may seem short compared to typical deadlines of 5–10 minutes in the unstructured bargaining
literature. Indeed, our deadline is comparable to the “high time pressure” setting of Karago¨zog˘lu and Kocher (2017), who set a
deadline of 90 seconds (in contrast to their 10–minute deadline under “low time pressure”). However, the differences they observe
between low and high time pressure are mainly confined to the frequency of disagreement and that of last–moment agreements,
while agreed splits of the cake are not substantially different between their treatments. Since our focus is on splits of the cake rather
than if or when agreement takes place, their results suggest our two–minute deadline should not be a problem. In fact, we observe
that of those bargainers in our UBG treatment not reaching agreement, 66.4 percent made no proposal in the last 30 seconds, and
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of £0.01 for the sender and one for the receiver, adding up to the cake size or less. Proposals could not be
withdrawn once made, and no messages were possible apart from the proposals (“tacit”, rather than “ex-
plicit”, bargaining). Both own and opponent proposals were displayed on the subject’s screen. A subject
could choose to accept any of the opponent’s proposals, which were listed in order of increasing own payoff,
making it trivial to determine the most favourable one (though subjects could accept less favourable propos-
als if they wished). The negotiation stage ended if a proposal was accepted, if either subject in a pair chose
to end it (by clicking a button on the screen), or if the time had expired without an accepted proposal; in
these latter two cases, the disagreement outcome was imposed. End–of–round feedback comprised own and
opponent words encoded and disagreement payoffs, whether agreement was reached, and own and opponent
payoffs.
At the end of round 10, the session ended and subjects were paid, privately and individually. For each
subject, two bargaining rounds and two task–only rounds were randomly chosen, and the subject was paid
his/her earnings in those four rounds. There was no show–up fee. Total earnings averaged £19.40 for
advantaged subjects (with a standard deviation of £2.96) and £13.34 for disadvantaged subjects (with a
standard deviation of £2.17), for a session that typically lasted about 90–100 minutes (including about 10
minutes devoted to instructions, and another 10 minutes for other administration such as collecting consent
forms).
4.2 Hypotheses
Here, we list three null hypotheses, each an implication of standard bargaining theory. Along with each, we
include a corresponding conjecture about how observed behaviour might deviate from the standard theory.
As described in Section 2.3, standard theory predicts own– and opponent–disagreement–payoff effects
of one–half, and a combined effect of unity. This yields our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 For both games, and irrespective of the distribution of bargaining power between the players,
demands and payoffs respond fully (to the predicted extent) to changes in the disagreement outcome.
While this null hypothesis could be rejected in two ways – either from observed responsiveness being higher
or lower than predicted – the literature has been consistent in reporting only under–responsiveness. We
therefore have
Conjecture 1 For both games, and irrespective of the distributionof bargaining power between the players,
demands and payoffs under–respond to changes in the disagreement outcome.
Some researchers (e.g., Skyrms, 1996; Binmore, 2007) have argued that the NDG already captures the
important features of bargaining environments, which would imply that the more complex structure of the
UBG adds nothing of strategic importance, so that outcomes ought to be similar under the two institutions.
81.4 percent made no proposal in the last 15 seconds. So, it seems that for the majority of bargainers, time pressure is a secondary
concern.
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On the other hand, Feltovich and Swierzbinski (2011) argued that the higher level of strategic uncertainty
in the NDG should lead to different outcomes compared to the UBG, and in their experiment they find
some differences in the types of agreements reached, with more agreements close to the 50–50 split in their
analogue to the NDG than in their analogue to the UBG. This result implies the following hypothesis and
conjecture for the current study:
Hypothesis 2 Responsiveness to changes in the disagreement outcome will be the same in both games.
Conjecture 2 Responsiveness to changes in the disagreement outcome will be higher in the UBG than in
the NDG.
Finally, we conjecture that while the attraction of the 50–50 split tends to be strong in bargaining experi-
ments, this attraction will be reduced when there is dominant bargaining power. In this case, the 50–50 split
is no longer an equilibrium outcome, and is therefore lost as a potential focal point. As a result, the power
of alternative focal points – most notably, the theoretical prediction – should increase correspondingly. This
gives rise to our last hypothesis and conjecture:
Hypothesis 3 Responsiveness to changes in the disagreement outcome will be the same irrespective of
whether or not the favoured player has dominant bargaining power.
Conjecture 3 Responsiveness to changes in the disagreement outcome will be higher when the favoured
player has dominant bargaining power than when neither player does.
5 Experimental results
In our analysis, we express quantities like demands, payoffs, and disagreement outcomes as fractions or
percents of the cake size. We concentrate on four sub–samples of the experimental data–set. In the NDG,
each subject makes a single demand, which may or may not lead to agreement. Our first sub–sample will
comprise all bargaining pairs in the NDG (we will often call this “NDG–all”) – giving us one demand for
each member of the pair, for all NDG pairs over all rounds. Our second sub–sample is a subset of the
first, comprising only the demands of those pairs reaching agreement; this is our “NDG–agreements” sub–
sample. (Note that in both NDG and UBG, demand conditional on agreement is by definition equal to payoff
conditional on agreement.)
In the UBG, each subject may make a single proposal, multiple proposals, or no proposals at all. Each
proposal made by a subject could be interpreted as a demand by that subject. Moreover, a subject’s accep-
tance of an opponent proposal, and even failure to accept a proposal, can be construed as carrying infor-
mation about demands. Inferring a single demand from all of a subject’s behaviour in a UBG round thus
necessarily carries a big subjective element. To minimise this subjectivity, we classify UBG demands based
on unambiguous rules. Our “UBG–agreements” sub–sample is straightforward. We interpret each accepted
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proposal in the UBG as a pair of compatible demands; if a pair does not reach an agreement, it is left out
of this sub–sample. Our “UBG–all” sub–sample includes these demands, but additionally, in cases where
agreement was not reached, we examine the sequence of proposals and counter–proposals to find the lowest
amount each bargainer proposed for him/herself. If this lowest amount exists (i.e., if the subject made at
least one proposal), this was taken to be the demand. If a subject made no proposals and did not accept
an opponent proposal, that subject was left out of this subsample. (This happened only once in 440 UBG
observations.)
5.1 Preliminaries
Table 4 shows that in about 5.5% of bargaining pairs, the advantaged player (the subject with the easier task)
becomes the unfavoured player (the one with the lower disagreement payoff) by encoding fewer words than
the disadvantaged player. In another 2.2%, bargaining is symmetric (disagreement payoffs are equal). In
Table 4: Real–effort task statistics (bargaining rounds)
Task difficulties (advantaged/disadvantaged player)
Easy/Easy Easy/Hard Hard/Easy Hard/Hard Total
in total 88 88 176 88 440
with di lower for 3 1 15 5 24
Number advantaged player (3.4%) (1.1%) (8.5%) (5.7%) (5.5%)
of pairs with di lower or equal 3 1 22 8 34
for advantaged player (3.4%) (1.1%) (12.5%) (9.1%) (7.7%)
with df > 0.5 43 47 12 3 105
(48.9%) (53.4%) (6.8%) (3.4%) (23.9%)
with df + du ≥ 1 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
just under one–quarter of pairs, the advantaged player encodes enough words in a bargaining round to earn
dominant bargaining power. Finally, bargainers’ disagreement payoffs never totalled the cake size or more,
so there were always gains to be made from agreement.
5.2 Aggregate behaviour
The first row of Table 5 shows that agreements (compatible demands in the NDG, accepted proposals in
the UBG) are more frequent in the UBG – unsurprisingly given its lower strategic uncertainty. A non–
parametric robust rank–order test confirms this difference is significant (two–sided test, matching–group–
level data, p < 0.001).10 The next rows show that 50–50 splits are substantiallymore likely when there is no
10See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for descriptions of the non–parametric statistical tests used in this paper, as well as for tables
of critical values. Some critical values for the robust rank–order test are from Feltovich (2005).
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dominant bargaining power – comprising about a third of all outcomes in both NDG and UBG when there is
no dominant bargaining power, but only about five percent of outcomes when there is dominant bargaining
power – consistent with our conjecture that equal splits are focal if and only if they are individually rational.
These differences are also significant (two–sided Wilcoxon signed–ranks test, matching–group–level data,
p ≈ 0.003 for NDG, p ≈ 0.002 for UBG, p < 0.001 for both games pooled).
Table 5: Aggregate statistics – bargaining outcomes (all rounds)
Game: NDG UBG
Subject type: advantaged/ favoured/ advantaged/ favoured/
disadvantaged unfavoured disadvantaged unfavoured
Agreement frequency 0.618 0.800
Frequency of equal splits conditional on agreement....
...when df > 0.5 0.053 0.077
...when df < 0.5 0.538 0.423
Mean disagreement payoff (di) 0.426/0.258 0.433/0.253 0.424/0.263 0.430/0.259
Frequency of di > 0.5 0.241/0.000 0.241/0.000 0.236/0.000 0.236/0.000
Mean demand, unconditional 0.563/0.482 0.563/0.483 0.562/0.453 0.569/0.446
Mean demand, given agreement 0.504/0.442 0.507/0.440 0.553/0.447 0.560/0.439
The remainder of the table shows, for both games, the mean disagreement payoff for both advantaged
and disadvantaged subjects; the fraction of observations with dominant bargaining power; and both types’
mean demands, both unconditional and conditional on agreement. The table also shows the correspond-
ing statistics for favoured and unfavoured subjects. As results are not extremely sensitive to whether we
categorise by disadvantaged/advantaged or favoured/unfavoured status, we will concentrate on the latter.
One result suggested by Table 5 is that the favoured player makes some, but only limited, use of her better
bargaining position. In the NDG, favoured subjects’ disagreement payoffs are higher than their opponents’
by an average of 17% of the cake (i.e., 17 percentage points), but overall, they demand only 8% more of the
cake, and conditional on agreement, the difference is only about 6% of the cake. This under–exploitation of
bargaining power is less stark in the UBG, but still present: on average, despite having a higher disagreement
payoff by over 16% of the cake, the favoured player demands only 11%more of the cake, and the difference
is the same in agreements.
Table 6 reports corresponding non–parametric test results. The first row shows that favoured subjects do
take account of their stronger bargaining power, demanding significantly more than unfavoured subjects do.
On the other hand, the second row shows that they significantly under–exploit their bargaining power; the
difference is demands between favoured and unfavoured players is significantly smaller than the difference
in their disagreement payoffs. Finally, the bottom row gives evidence of systematic differences between the
UBG and NDG treatments. Specifically, the difference (xf − xu)− (df − du), the extent to which subjects
17
Table 6: p–values from non–parametric tests on matching–group–level data (all rounds)
Within–game tests NDG (all) NDG (agreements) UBG (all) UBG (agreements)
xf > xu p ≈ 0.001 p ≈ 0.005 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
xf − xu < df − du p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p ≈ 0.002
Between–game tests NDG (all) vs. UBG (all) NDG (agreements) vs. UBG (agreements)
(xf − xu)− (df − du) smaller in NDG p < 0.01 p ≈ 0.02
Wilcoxon signed–ranks test used for within–game tests, robust rank–order test used for between–game tests. Both use
two–tailed rejection regions.
exploit their bargaining power, is significantly less in the NDG than in the UBG. This means that while
favoured subjects do not fully exploit their status in either game, they exploit it more in the UBG than in the
NDG.
5.3 Parametric statistical analysis
We next use panel regressions to disentangle the effect of the disagreement outcome from various other
factors that might influence bargaining outcomes. We estimate specifications with demands as the dependent
variable, separately for all bargaining pairs and agreements only, and leaving out the observations with
a symmetric bargaining game (since in that case there is no favoured player). For each sub–sample, we
estimate three Tobit models: one for each game (NDG or UBG) separately, and a third with the games
pooled. The main explanatory variables are the own and opponent disagreement payoffs (di and d−i), a
UBG indicator (for the specifications that use both games) and an indicator for dominant bargaining power.
We also include all of the two– and three–way interactions among disagreement payoff, the UBG indicator
when it is included, and the dominant–bargaining–power indicator, as well as several control variables, a
constant term, and subject random effects.11
11See the supplementary materials for the Stata commands and output corresponding to these models. The control variables
include demographics, an indicator for bargaining taking place in odd–numbered rounds, an indicator for favoured–player status,
the block number and its products with the disagreement payoffs, and both own and opponent performance on the real–effort task.
These last two variables – the number of letters in the words successfully encoded – measure raw ability of the two bargainers,
unaffected by whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged, or whether they are facing the harder or easier version of the task.
Since we view all of these additional variables as “nuisance” variables, we will not devote much discussion to results concerning
them. In particular, the demographic variables did not yield any significant effects. However, we do note that the estimated marginal
effects of the own– and opponent–disagreement–payoff variables are higher in block 5 than in block 1. While these differences
are either weakly significant or insignificant, they do imply that if disagreement–payoff responsiveness does change over time, it
increases rather than decreasing. Finally, we mention that besides the models described in this section, we estimated a number of
related models (available from the corresponding author upon request) as robustness checks, none of which affects the main results
in any important way. These include a Tobit including only those observations with dominant bargaining power, Tobits on the
entire sample but with only the main explanatory variables (with or without the block number, which turns out to be significant),
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Table 7 presents estimated average marginal effects and standard errors for each variable (estimated by
Stata, version 12). Three aspects of these results are worth mentioning here. First, all twelve of the estimated
Table 7: Regression results: average marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses
Dependent var– NDG/UBG (all) NDG/UBG (agreements)
iable: demand (xi) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Own disagr. payoff (di) 0.362
∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.161) (0.092) (0.071) (0.107) (0.088)
Opp. disagr. payoff (d−i) −0.182
∗ –0.104 −0.332∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.182∗ −0.325∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.161) (0.094) (0.071) (0.106) (0.089)
UBG −0.016∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Dominant barg. power (dbp) –0.008 –0.017 –0.003 –0.004 –0.014 0.007
(0.019) (0.033) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.017)
block number −0.006∗∗ −0.010∗∗ –0.002 0.003 0.005 –0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
barg. in odd–numbered rounds 0.007 0.011 –0.002 –0.002 0.000 –0.003
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
favoured player –0.001 –0.016 0.007 0.000 –0.007 0.012
(0.018) (0.031) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017)
letters encoded (hundreds) –0.008 –0.034 0.040 0.012 0.013 0.028
(0.028) (0.046) (0.031) (0.023) (0.034) (0.030)
opp. letters encoded (hundreds) 0.026 0.043 0.002 –0.003 0.017 –0.034
(0.027) (0.045) (0.028) (0.021) (0.030) (0.027)
Bargaining game Both NDG UBG Both NDG UBG
Demographic variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 859 428 431 606 262 344
|ln(L)| 692.65 247.54 532.47 765.08 310.93 478.47
* (**,***): Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
marginal effects for own– and opponent–disagreement–payoff effects have magnitudes less than one–half,
consistent with the earlier evidence of under–responsiveness we have seen.12 However, these are average
marginals; we will see results for marginals conditional on the game and presence of dominant bargaining
power in Table 8 below. Second, while there appear to be differences in absolute size between own– and
opponent–disagreement–payoff effects in some of the specifications – as large as 30 percentage points in
Model 2 – none of these differences are significant, meaning we cannot reject any null hypothesis that these
effects are equal. Third, neither own nor opponent letters encoded has a significant effect in any of the
and linear models with either bootstrapped standard errors or clustering by matching group.
12The differences from one–half are usually, but not always, significant. Of the twelve marginal effects reported in the table, ten
(all but the own–disagreement–payoff effects in [1] and [2]) are significantly less than one–half at the 10 percent level, with two of
these (the opponent–disagreement–payoff effects in [3] and [6]) are significantly less than one–half at the 10 percent level but not
the 5 percent level.
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Table 8: Point estimates and confidence intervals for combined disagreement–payoff effects, from Models
1 and 4 in Table 7
All bargaining pairs Agreements
NDG UBG sig. diff.? NDG UBG sig. diff.?
No dbp Point est. 0.271 0.674 p < 0.001 0.254 0.675 p < 0.001
95% CI (0.010, 0.531) (0.403, 0.944) (0.053, 0.455) (0.466, 0.884)
dbp Point est. 0.700 0.820 p ≈ 0.21 0.723 0.870 p ≈ 0.11
95% CI (0.514, 0.886) (0.630, 1.011) (0.554, 0.891) (0.721, 1.020)
Point est’s sig. diff.? p < 0.001 p ≈ 0.20 p < 0.001 p ≈ 0.02
Notes: dbp = dominant bargaining power; CI = confidence interval; est. = estimate; sig. diff. = significantly different.
specifications, and the point estimates for these variables are tiny in magnitude (the interquartile range of 29
letters represents at most a change of about 1 percent of the cake). This suggests that ability to perform the
real–effort task has little impact on bargaining outcomes other than via its effect on disagreement payoffs.
The main results from these Tobits are summarised in Table 8: point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals for the combined disagreement–payoff effect (the sum of the absolute values of the marginal effects
of di and d−i), based on Model 1 for all demands and Model 4 for agreements only, and taken at values of
0 and 1 for the UBG and dominant–bargaining–power indicators. This gives us the effects for all four
combinations of NDG vs. UBG and with vs. without dominant bargaining power. Chi–square tests strongly
reject the null hypothesis of equal effects across the four combinations (χ2
3
≈ 25.66 for all observations and
45.38 for agreements, p < 0.001 in both); therefore we also report p–values for the corresponding ceteris
paribus pair–wise comparisons. These show that subjects are least responsive to their bargaining power
in the NDG with no dominant bargaining power; the combined effect of 0.271 (all bargaining pairs) or
0.254 (agreements only) is far below the theoretical prediction of one, and indeed one is well outside either
of the corresponding confidence intervals. Responsiveness is much higher – and significantly so – in the
UBG without dominant bargaining power, with point estimates of 0.674 and 0.675. However, these are still
well below the theoretical prediction of one, which again lies outside both of the corresponding confidence
intervals.
With dominant bargaining power, responsiveness to bargaining power increases, sometimes drastically.
In the NDG, the difference is especially striking – a rise from 0.271 to 0.700 (over all observations) or from
0.254 to 0.723 (over agreements) of the theoretically–predicted level – and is significant, though even so,
this leaves disagreement–payoff responsiveness still well below one. In the UBG, responsiveness increases
from 0.674 to 0.820 (all observations), or from 0.675 to 0.870 (agreements), under dominant bargaining
power compared to without it; these differences are significant for agreements (though not for the case of
all observations). Also in the UBG with dominant bargaining power, the corresponding confidence interval
contains one, meaning that in this case, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects respond to changes
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in their bargaining power to the extent predicted by theory.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
In the NDG without dominant bargaining power, we observe low responsiveness to changes in bargaining
position, consistent with previous studies where bargaining position was manipulated via disagreement out-
comes (Fischer et al., 2007; Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013). Since disagreement payoffs were earned in our
experiment and assigned in those previous experiments, this suggests that making subjects earn their bar-
gaining position may not have a substantial effect on subsequent bargaining outcomes. Clearly this is not a
controlled comparison, however, and such interpretations should be made with caution. Future research into
the effects of earned versus assigned bargaining position is welcome.13
Both the bargaining institutionand the existence of equilibriumequal splits have profound effects on bar-
gaining outcomes, as hypothesised. Responsiveness to disagreement payoffs increases as we move from the
NDG to the UBG, likely due to the lower amount of strategic uncertainty and resultant less severe coordina-
tion problem in the latter, which reduces the attractiveness of the 50–50 split. Responsiveness is also higher
with dominant bargaining power than without, as when 50–50 splits are no longer individually rational, they
are no longer focal, so that bargainers have to rely on alternative focal points. These treatment effects are
not only statistically significant, but large in magnitude. Starting from the NDG without dominant bargain-
ing power, either changing the game to the UBG or adding dominant bargaining power (i.e., moving from
the top–left corner either rightward or downward within either panel of Table 8) increases disagreement–
payoff responsiveness by roughly 40–45 percentage points. From there, adding the other (i.e., moving to
the bottom–right corner in either panel of Table 8) increases responsiveness by a further 12–20 percentage
points. In the UBG with dominant bargaining power, responsiveness approaches the theoretically predicted
level (100 percent), and indeed the corresponding 95% confidence interval includes this point prediction,
meaning that we could not reject the null hypothesis that subjects fully exploit their bargaining position.
Caution should always be taken when drawing conclusions based on failure to reject a null hypothesis, but
even with this caveat, our result is noteworthy, as we are unaware of any other finding of approximately full
exploitation of bargaining power in the literature.
Two of the design choices we made for the experiment are worth re–stating here, as each implies a
possible future experiment aimed at replicating, or assessing the robustness of, our results. First, as noted
at the beginning of Section 4, subjects’ bargaining power is earned via task performance, but the difficulty
13Two recent studies find that real effort does matter. Franco-Watkins et al. (2013) use a set of unincentivised experiments to
compare bargaining when the surplus was earned versus when it was a “windfall”, and report that fairness considerations are more
important in the latter case. A recent working paper by Feltovich (2017) finds a similar result in an incentivised experiment that
exogenously varies whether disagreement payoffs are earned via a real–effort task (as in the current paper), assigned randomly
without a real–effort task (as in Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013), or – as an intermediate case – assigned randomly but with the real–
effort task used as a hurdle to reaching the bargaining stage. Comparison between the first treatment and the other two suggests a
small but significant increase in responsiveness to bargaining position when this position is earned compared to when it is assigned.
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of the task is exogenously assigned, meaning that bargaining power still carries an unearned component.
Second, as noted in Section 4.1, neither of our bargaining institutions allow communication except through
the proposals themselves (“cheap talk” is not possible). Future experiments may alter one or both of these
design choices. Intuitively, it is unclear how this might affect the results. If responsiveness to changes
in bargaining position is actually greater when bargaining position is fully earned compared to when it
is partially earned and partially assigned, then clearly, making bargaining position fully earned ought to
increase responsiveness, while keeping the task as it is but calling attention to the assigned component could
decrease it – though as mentioned at the beginning of this section, our current results suggest that the extent
to which bargaining position is earned might not matter as much as conjectured. Similarly, adding cheap
talk to the bargaining environment could increase responsiveness by allowing favoured bargainers to argue
for the “standard” bargaining–theory prediction, but on the other hand, it could also push outcomes toward
the 50–50 split by reducing the social distance between bargainers. Further research in these and related
areas is very welcome.
We close with some implications for applied theorists and experimenters. First, our finding of a general
under–responsiveness to disagreement payoffs, and the sensitivity of this responsiveness to the presence or
absence of dominant bargaining power, highlight the importance of framing in bargaining experiments. We
conjecture that our results would have been quite different if our experiment had involved bargainers (a)
being given their disagreement payoffs immediately, and (b) bargaining over the remainder. This setting is
nearly isomorphic to ours (the only difference is that we allow individually irrational agreements), but we
would expect outcomes in such a hypothetical experiment to cluster around 50–50 splits of the remainder,
which would correspond to 100% responsiveness to disagreement payoffs in our actual experiment. If this is
true, then the standard modelling technique of normalising the bargaining problem so that the disagreement
outcome is (0, 0) is clearly not innocuous: absolute payoff amounts matter, not just payoffs relative to the
disagreement point.
Second, the differences we find between NDG and UBG suggest that the way bargaining is modelled
matters. Applications of bargaining in applied–theoretical models tend to assume a bargaining process
similar to our UBG (typically applying the Nash solution or a generalisation thereof), while experimental
tests of such models tend to use more highly abstracted bargaining games like the NDG. Implementing
bargaining this way carries the risk that the experimental results will not be generalisable back to the original
strategic setting, above and beyond any other concerns about the external validity of lab experiments. This
may actually be good news for theorists, since experimental results that seem inconsistent with standard
theory may be at least partly an artifact of how the theory was implemented in the experiment, rather than
owing to any intrinsic weakness of the theory itself.
Third, our results cast some light on how a descriptive theory of bargaining might look. Normative
solution concepts that assume translation invariance, such as Nash’s (1950) and Kalai and Smorodin-
sky’s (1975), will have difficulty explaining the under–responsiveness that we have observed. Anbarci
and Feltovich (2013) showed that this kind of under–responsiveness is consistent with some models of
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other–regarding preferences. However, the differing results for NDG and UBG in the current study suggest
that other–regarding preferences are at best only part of the explanation, as we can see no plausible reason
for individuals’ distastes for inequality to differ according to the bargaining institution. If other–regarding
preferences are to have an impact, it may be an indirect one, via their influence on focal points.14
14An earlier version of this paper presented a simple focal–point–based model that explains our main results, along with some
secondary results such as higher agreement frequency in UBG than in NDG. For space reasons we do not include it here; however
it is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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A.1   Instructions from the experiment 
 
Below is the text of instructions for our UBG treatment with bargaining in even-numbered rounds, followed 
by the text of instructions for our NDG treatment with bargaining in odd-numbered rounds. The instructions 
for the other two treatments are analogous, and available from the corresponding author upon request. 
 
[UBG instructions] 
 
You are about to participate in a study of decision making. Please read these instructions carefully, as your 
payment may depend on how well you understand them. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the 
experimenter. We ask that you not talk with the other participants – or anyone else – during the experiment.  
 
The main part of this experiment consists of ten rounds. In each round, you will perform an encoding task. 
Your computer screen will display a “word” – a sequence of 1-10 letters of the alphabet – along with a key 
showing the number that corresponds to each letter. Below each letter on your screen will be a blank space. 
Inside each space, you should type the number that corresponds to the letter above it. Once you have 
encoded the entire word, click the “OK” button. If you have encoded the word correctly, the computer will 
accept it and display a new word. The key will stay the same for all words during a round, but may change 
from round to round. 
 
Example: Suppose the key is as follows (this is just an example; the actual key might be different): 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 9 5 4 10 6 7 3 8 2 
 
Suppose the word you are given is G – A – J – F – J. The code for G is 7 (below G in the table), and the codes 
for A, J, F and J are 1, 2, 6 and 2. So, you would encode this word as 7 – 1 – 2 – 6 – 2, then click “OK”.  
 
In each round of the experiment, you will have five minutes to encode as many words as you wish. In rounds 
1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, the round ends after the five minutes have finished, and your profit is 15p (£0.15) for each 
word you correctly encoded. 
 
In rounds 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, there is another stage after the encoding task is over. In this stage, you have the 
opportunity to bargain with a randomly chosen participant, over a prize of £10. The way you bargain is by 
sending and receiving proposals for dividing the £10. Below is an example of how the bottom portion of your 
computer screen will look during this bargaining stage. 
 
  
To send a proposal to the other person, type the amounts for yourself and the other person in the “Make a 
proposal” box, then click “Send proposal”. The amounts you enter must be between 0 and 10 (inclusive), 
and can have 0, 1 or 2 decimal places. The two amounts together must add up to £10 or less. All of your 
proposals will appear in the box in the bottom-centre of your screen, and all of the proposals made by the 
other person will appear in the box in the bottom-right. The person paired with you will see these proposals as 
well, but no one else will be able to see your proposals, nor will you be able to see theirs.  
 
You may accept any one of the proposals from the person paired with you, or none of them. To accept a 
proposal, highlight the one you wish to accept and click “Accept proposal”. If either you or the other person 
accepts a proposal, then you have reached an agreement, and the prize is divided according to the accepted 
proposal. 
 
The bargaining stage lasts for up to 2 minutes; you may send as many or as few proposals as you wish during 
that time. You may end the bargaining stage before the 2 minutes are over, by clicking on the button labelled 
“End this stage” on the right of your screen. Once you or the person matched with you has clicked this 
button, it is not possible to send or accept proposals.  
 
If you or the other person ends the bargaining stage early, or if the time available for proposals ends without 
you reaching an agreement, then you receive an outside option equal to 15p for each word you had encoded, 
and the other person receives an outside option equal to 15p for each word he/she had encoded. Both you and 
the person paired with you are informed of both outside options at the beginning of the bargaining stage. 
 
Organisation of the experiment: This experimental session has three parts. 
(1) We will begin with a short questionnaire, where you will answer some demographic questions. 
(2) Next, there will be a one-minute practice round, so that you can familiarise yourself with the encoding 
task. After the one minute has ended, the computer screen will show the number of words you correctly 
encoded. The results of this practice round will not affect the amount you are paid. 
(3) Then, the main part of the experiment will begin. Each round proceeds as follows: 
(a) You perform the encoding task. In odd-numbered rounds, you earn 15p for each word correctly 
encoded. In even-numbered rounds, this amount becomes your outside option for the bargaining stage. 
(b) If it is an even-numbered round, the computer randomly pairs you with another participant, and your 
screen displays both of your outside options. You can send proposals for dividing the £10.00 prize. The 
other person can also send proposals for dividing the £10.00 prize; you can accept one of these proposals 
or none of them.  
(c) The round ends. Your computer screen displays the number of words you encoded and your profit. In 
even-numbered rounds, it also displays whether or not you reached an agreement, and the other person’s 
profit. 
 
Payments: The amount you are paid will depend on the results of the experiment. The computer will 
randomly select four rounds out of the ten you played. You will be paid the total of your profits from those 
selected rounds. Payments are made privately and in cash at the end of the session. 
 
[NDG instructions] 
 
You are about to participate in a study of decision making. Please read these instructions carefully, as your 
payment may depend on how well you understand them. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the 
experimenter. We ask that you not talk with the other participants – or anyone else – during the experiment.  
 
The main part of this experiment consists of ten rounds. In each round, you will perform an encoding task. 
Your computer screen will display a “word” – a sequence of 1-10 letters of the alphabet – along with a key 
showing the number that corresponds to each letter. Below each letter on your screen will be a blank space. 
Inside each space, you should type the number that corresponds to the letter above it. Once you have 
encoded the entire word, click the “OK” button. If you have encoded the word correctly, the computer will 
accept it and display a new word. The key will stay the same for all words during a round, but may change 
from round to round. 
 
Example: Suppose the key is as follows (this is just an example; the actual key might be different): 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 9 5 4 10 6 7 3 8 2 
 
Suppose the word you are given is G – A – J – F – J. The code for G is 7 (below G in the table), and the codes 
for A, J, F and J are 1, 2, 6 and 2. So, you would encode this word as 7 – 1 – 2 – 6 – 2, then click “OK”.  
 
In each round of the experiment, you will have five minutes to encode as many words as you wish. In rounds 
2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, the round ends after the five minutes have finished, and your profit is 15p (£0.15) for each 
word you correctly encoded. 
 
In rounds 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, there is another stage after the encoding task is over. In this stage, you have the 
opportunity to bargain with a randomly chosen participant, over a prize of £10. The way you bargain is by 
each making simultaneous claims for shares of the £10.  
- If your claim and the other person’s claim add up to £10 or less, you receive your claim, and the other 
person receives his/her claim.  
- If the claims add up to more than £10, you receive an outside option equal to 15p for each word you had 
encoded, and the other person receives an outside option equal to 15p for each word he/she had encoded.  
Both you and the person paired with you are informed of both outside options before choosing your claims. 
 
Organisation of the experiment: This experimental session has three parts. 
(1) We will begin with a short questionnaire, where you will answer some demographic questions. 
(2) Next, there will be a one-minute practice round, so that you can familiarise yourself with the encoding 
task. After the one minute has ended, the computer screen will show the number of words you correctly 
encoded. The results of this practice round will not affect the amount you are paid. 
(3) Then, the main part of the experiment will begin. Each round proceeds as follows: 
(a) You perform the encoding task. In even-numbered rounds, you earn 15p for each word correctly 
encoded. In odd-numbered rounds, this amount becomes your outside option for the bargaining stage. 
(b) If it is an odd-numbered round, the computer randomly pairs you with another participant, and your 
screen displays both of your outside options. You choose a claim for your share of the £10.00 prize. The 
other person chooses a claim for his/her share. Your claim can be any multiple of 0.01, between 0.00 and 
10.00 inclusive. Be sure to enter your claim before the allotted time runs out, or the computer will enter a 
claim of zero for you. 
(c) The round ends. Your computer screen displays the number of words you encoded and your profit. In 
odd-numbered rounds, it also displays your claim, the claim made by the person paired with you, and the 
other person’s profit. 
 
Payments: The amount you are paid will depend on the results of the experiment. The computer will 
randomly select four rounds out of the ten you played. You will be paid the total of your profits from those 
selected rounds. Payments are made privately and in cash at the end of the session. 
 
A.2 Sample screenshots from experiment 
Real-effort task: 
Error screen from real-effort task: 
Decision screen, NDG treatment:  
 
Feedback screen, NDG treatment: 
 
Bargaining stage screen, UBG treatment: 
 
Feedback screen, UBG treatment: 
 
 
 
